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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3212 
___________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM REED, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CRAIG HARPSTER, UNIT MANAGER; JEFFERY RACKOVAN, GRIEVANCE 
COORDINATOR; JAMES D. MORRIS, MAJOR; BRIAN THOMPSON, DEPUTY 
SUPERINTENDENT; FRANKLIN TENNIS, SUPERINTENDENT; DORINA 
VARNER, ACTING CHIEF HEARING OFFICER; ROBERT MARSH, DEPUTY 
SUPERINTENDENT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:09-cv-01618) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 8, 2012 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed:  December 11, 2012) 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Christopher William Reed appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders 
dismissing his complaint as to five of the seven defendants and granting the remaining 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Because the appeal presents no substantial 
question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s orders. 
I. 
 In August 2009, Reed, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Rockview, 
Pennsylvania (“SCI-Rockview”), filed a civil rights complaint against seven officers of 
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.  In the complaint, as amended in January 
2010, Reed claimed that Defendants Harpster and Thompson failed to protect him from 
an attack by his cellmate, Michael LaCava.  In particular, Reed claimed that: (1) Harpster 
and Thompson knew of LaCava’s record of two prior assaults at other prisons; (2) 
LaCava told Harpster that he intended to “lump up” Reed; and (3) LaCava sent a letter to 
Thompson stating that a “danger does exist” in placing him in a double cell.  Reed further 
alleged that all defendants participated in a conspiracy to cover-up Harpster’s and 
Thompson’s failure to protect Reed from attack.  Harpster served an answer to Reed’s 
complaint, and the other defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  The District Court subsequently dismissed Reed’s conspiracy claim 
as to all moving defendants, and dismissed Reed’s Eighth Amendment claim as to all 
moving defendants except Thompson.  The District Court then granted summary 
judgment in favor of Harpster and Thompson on the ground that Reed failed to create a 
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genuine dispute regarding whether the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive 
risk to Reed’s safety.  Reed timely appealed. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may summarily 
affirm a judgment of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial question.  
See I.O.P. 10.6. 
A. Dismissal of the claims against Defendants Rackovan, Morris, Varner, Marsh, 
Tennis, and Thompson 
Our review of a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim is plenary.  Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).  To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The complaint must 
contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant[s are] liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).   
First, as the District Court noted, Reed’s conspiracy claims against defendants 
Rackovan, Morris, Thompson, Varner, Marsh, and Tennis are not cognizable.   In order 
to sufficiently allege a claim of a civil rights conspiracy, the complaint must specifically 
set forth: (1) the conduct that violated the plaintiff’s rights; (2) the time and the place of 
the conduct; and (3) the identity of the officials responsible for the conduct.  See Oatess 
v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 431 n.8 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby 
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Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir. 1988)).  Furthermore, the allegations of conspiracy 
must be grounded firmly in facts; they cannot be conclusory nor can they hinge on bare 
suspicions and foundationless speculation.  See Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 
n.16 (3d Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal of conspiracy claims based upon mere suspicion 
and speculation).  Here, Reed made a foundationless allegation of conspiracy without 
setting forth any facts regarding the conduct, time, or place which constituted the 
conspiracy.  Therefore, Reed’s conspiracy claim did not satisfy the pleading requirements 
and was properly dismissed. 1
Second, the District Court correctly dismissed Reed’s Eighth Amendment claim 
against defendants Rackovan, Morris, Varner, Marsh, and Tennis.  “An individual 
government defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the 
alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat 
superior.”  Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)) (internal brackets omitted).  We agree 
with the District Court that Reed failed to put forth any facts suggesting that these 
defendants participated in the allegedly unconstitutional decision to place Reed in a cell 
with a dangerous cellmate.  They therefore cannot be held liable based only on the fact of 
their employment at SCI-Rockview. 
  
                                              
1 To the extent the District Court did not dispose of Reed’s conspiracy claim against 
Harpster, we note that this claim is also conclusory, and we deem it properly dismissed. 
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B. Grant of summary judgment in favor of Harpster and Thompson 
Our review of a district court’s order granting summary judgment is plenary.  
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1250 (3d Cir. 1992).  Summary judgment 
may be granted only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must 
show that: (1) “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious 
harm;” and (2) prison officials operated with “deliberate indifference to [his] health or 
safety.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).  Deliberate indifference may be 
proven by showing that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 
health or safety.”  Id. at 837.  Not only must a prison official be “aware of facts from 
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but the 
official “must also draw the inference.”  Id.  Here, the only evidence Reed proffered to 
show that Thompson was aware of a substantial risk from LaCava is a letter LaCava 
wrote to Thompson in early July 2008 requesting placement in a single cell.  In that letter, 
LaCava states generally that “danger does exist” in placing him in a double cell.  While 
this may suggest some risk, LaCava also states that he is “not a . . . predator . . . [or] 
troublemaker . . . [, n]or do I have a assaultive history— I choose to conduct myself with 
dignity, respect and class at all times.”   He also explains that he will not refuse another 
order to be housed in a double cell.  Although LaCava had previously expressed his 
desire to be housed alone, he had not previously engaged in violence at SCI Rockview, 
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and his prison record of misconduct contains only two prior acts of violence elsewhere—
one in 2001 and the other in 2006, 19 months before his assault on Reed.  Reed offered 
only his belief, and no admissible evidence, to support his claim that Harpster was ever 
made aware of LaCava’s intent to hurt his cell mate.  We agree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that the evidence in the record is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact that either Thompson or Harpster knew of a substantial risk to Reed’s safety 
and acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. 
Accordingly, this appeal presents us with no substantial question, and we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3rd Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
